Just the Facts:The Any Evidence Standard and New Theories on Appeal

We wanted to update you on a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals regarding the proper role of the superior courts on review and the difference between a fictional new injury and a cumulative trauma.

In JMJ Plumbing, et. al. vs. Cudihy, A12A1348, the Court of Appeals was called upon to review the decision of a Superior Court after the Superior Court had reversed an Appellate Division decision overturning an ALJ Award of benefits. The facts showed that the Claimant worked for the Employer as a plumber. On September 2, 2008, while performing a digging task on the job, he felt a sharp pain in his back that radiated into his lower leg. The Claimant never reported the injury to his Employer, and he continued to perform his regular work duties. On June 25, 2009, almost nine months after his September 2, 2008 date of injury, the Claimant first reported the injury to the Employer. The Employer then gave him light duty work, and the Claimant continued to be on light duty until he was terminated for reasons unrelated to his injury in August 2009.

Following his termination, the Claimant filed for workers’ compensation and used June 25, 2009 as his accident date. The ALJ awarded the Claimant disability and medical benefits based on a fictional new date of injury. Specifically, the ALJ found that the Claimant had experienced a gradual worsening of his condition and that he could therefore use June 25, 2009 as his date of injury. Not surprisingly, the Employer appealed the ALJ’s Award. The Appellate Division vacated the ALJ’s Award and denied the claim, finding that since the Claimant admittedly continued to be capable of performing his work after the June 25, 2009 date of injury, the Claimant was not disabled as of that date. The Claimant then appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the Appellate Division. The Superior Court found that the Appellate Division should have considered whether the Claimant suffered a cumulative trauma instead of reviewing the case on the fictional new date of injury theory. To support this, the Superior Court made numerous findings of fact. After the Superior Court decision, the Employer appealed the claim to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court and denied the claim, holding that the Superior Court had overstepped its bounds and did not apply the “any evidence” standard in reviewing the claim. The Court noted that because the Appellate Division’s findings that the Claimant could continue to perform his job until he was terminated were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals could not then substitute a new legal theory and act as a fact-finder to reverse the Appellate Division. The real question on appeal was whether the Claimant’s condition had worsened or not, and because there was any evidence to support the Appellate Division’s holding that the Claimant’s condition had not worsened, the Superior Court could not act as a fact-finding body and substitute its findings on the matter.

This Court of Appeals decision reminds us that the superior court must give great deference to the Appellate Division and uphold any decision in which the correct legal theory is applied and there is any evidence to support it. Also, the facts of JMJ Plumbing offer us some assistance with future defenses against claims involving fictional new dates of injury. The Claimant’s continued work and his testimony that he was able to perform his job duties past June 25, 2009 helped the Employer defeat the claim. We will use these facts to assist us with defending against future claims.

We will keep you updated as to any new issues and any changes in Georgia Workers’ Compensation. If you have any questions, please let us know. We look forward to continuing to serve you in the future.