SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT TASKS – LIMITS TO THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

In Georgia, it is well established that an employee is generally not acting in the course of his employment when traveling to and from work. However, one of the exceptions to this rule is the “special task” rule. This exception allows for an accident to be deemed compensable when the employee is engaged in a “special task” for the employer.  Batten v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 339 (1978). In Georgia, the emphasis on this exception is placed on the benefit to the employer, rather than any inconvenience of the off -premises journey to the employee. Harrison v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 247 Ga. App. 6 (2000).

While there has not been substantial litigation on this issue in Georgia, it is important to note that the Courts have established certain fact patterns that do not amount to an employee engaged in a “special task” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In Batten, the Court of Appeals ruled that even when an employee was told to report to work two hours early and was injured while on his way to work, this did not amount to a “special task.” The Court stated that this would be true even if the claimant was to perform work which was different from his usual duties. It is also important to note that in arriving at its holding, the Court stated that  that the special task which the claimant was to perform did not start until he reached his place of employment.  However, the Court included additional language stating that the claimant in Batten was not on call, indicating its ruling could have turned on that issue.

In Harrison, the Court applied the ruling in Batten to slightly different and more complicated circumstances. In Harrison, the claimant was an assistant manager at the employer’s Chamblee store (“Chamblee”). While working at Chamblee, the claimant received a call from the manager of the employer’s other store in Buford(“Buford”), asking him to come work at Buford after he completed his shift at Chamblee. The Court in Harrison noted that in order to work at Buford, the claimant would have needed to clock in, been provided a new badge number and clock number, and had a new employer file created to reflect his work at Buford. After clocking out of Chamblee at 1:30 a.m., and while en route to Buford, the claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The Court in Harrison ruled these facts did not amount to a “special task,” as the Court held that even though the trip occurred at 1:30 a.m., the trip was not substantial enough to constitute a benefit to his employer in and of itself. The Court in Harrison further supported the defense that in Georgia, a special commute to perform overtime work, which is analogous to the special trip undertaken by the claimant in Harrison to perform overtime work, is not within the course of employment.

The holdings in Batten and Harrison demonstrate that unique employment scenarios do not necessarily amount to a “special task.”  However, had the claimant in Batten been on call, or had the claimant in Harrison been transporting goods from Chamblee to Buford, we suspect the Courts could have found the claimants were engaged in special tasks and suffered compensable injuries. Thus, it is important to consider discussing these fact patterns with supervisors to explain that what can start off as a casual request to perform additional work can amount to a “special task” for purposes of workers’ compensation.