Diversified Holds On – Appellate Review of Certain Zoning Decisions Requires Application

Georgia’s zoning procedures have been the subject of legislation in recent years, addressing, in large part, the procedure for appealing local government zoning decisions.  The Georgia Supreme Court’s recent opinion, in Sockwell Corners, LLC v. Newton County[1], analyzes the current Zoning Procedures Law and Appellate Practice Act in reaching a decision regarding the procedure for appealing a trial court ruling on a local government zoning decision to the state’s appellate courts.

In Sockwell Corners, the developer and owner appealed the County’s denial of their rezoning application to the superior court.  After the superior court ruled in favor of the County, the developer and owner filed a direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.  Inquiring into its own jurisdiction, the Supreme Court requested briefing from the parties regarding whether the appeal should be dismissed because the developer and owner filed a direct appeal instead of following the discretionary application procedure.  The Court considered the amendments in recent years to Georgia’s Zoning Procedures Law and Appellate Practice Act.  The owner and developer argued that the discretionary appeal procedure of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 did not apply because the decision being reviewed was legislative.  The developer and owner relied upon “the 2022 changes to the Zoning Procedures Law, which cast the ‘denial of an amendment to a zoning ordinance to rezone property from one zoning classification to another’ as both a ‘zoning decision’ and ‘legislative’ in nature [ . . . ] and not ‘quasi-judicial[2].’”  However, based upon its precedent, primarily Diversified Holdings v. City of Suwanee[3], and the Appellate Practice Act, the Court determined that the appeal involved the decision of a superior court reviewing the decision of a local administrative agency, requiring appeal to the Supreme Court by discretionary application.  The Court reasoned as follows:

The Zoning Procedures Law’s characterization of the “denial of an amendment to a zoning ordinance to rezone property from one zoning classification to another” as “legislative,” see O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-3(4)(C), 36-66-5.1(a)(1), does not alter the essential characteristics of the sort of decision at issue here: “individualized application of law to facts and circumstances that constitutes an adjudicative decision” such that it constitutes a “decision” as that term is used to refer to “decisions of …state and local administrative agencies in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (a)(1)[4].

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for failure to follow the discretionary application procedure. Although the appeal was ultimately dismissed, Justice Bethel authored a concurrence acknowledging the statutory confusion and pointing to possible future action by the General Assembly for clarity.

[1] Sockwell Corners, LLC, et. al. v. Newton County, 2026 WL 1541174 (2026).

[2] Id.

[3] 302 Ga. 597 (2017).

[4] See Diversified Holdings, 302 Ga. at 603.

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